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Abstract
This event study investigates the impact of the Japanese nuclear disaster in Fukushima-Daiichi on
the daily stock prices of French, German, Japanese, and U.S. nuclear utility and alternative energy
firms. Hypotheses regarding the (cumulative) abnormal returns based on a three-factor model are
analyzed through joint tests by multivariate regression models and bootstrapping. Our results show
significant abnormal returns for Japanese nuclear utility firms during the one-week event window and
the subsequent four-week post-event window. Furthermore, while French and German nuclear utility
and alternative energy stocks exhibit significant abnormal returns during the event window,we cannot
confirm abnormal returns for U.S. stocks.
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1 Introduction
On March 11, 2011, an earthquake and ensuing
tsunami devastated extensive parts of the north-
eastern Japanese coastline. Besides the natural
catastrophe, the concern of an imminent nuclear
meltdown after the loss of cooling capabilities in
the Fukushima-Daiichi power plant invoked wide-
reaching global attention. The release of major
amounts of radioactive material compelled the
Japanese government to implement an exclusion
zone within a 20-kilometer radius of the power
plant, an area formerly populated by 80,000 peo-
ple. The accident intensified the international dis-
cussion concerning the hazard of nuclear power
plants as well as its effect on the countries’ tran-
sition to alternative, clean energy forms. For in-
stance, on March 14, only three days after the
earthquake, the German government announced
that it would thoroughly reconsider its nuclear
energy policy and accelerate the changeover to
alternative energies.
It isnot surprising that the incident alsoaffected in-
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initial value of 100 on January 3, 2011.
Source: S&P Index Data Platform.
ternational stockmarkets, particularly utility stock
prices. For example, on the first and the second
trading day after the disaster, i.e., March 14 and
15, daily returns of the S&P Global Nuclear Energy
Index, a worldwide index comprising 24 compa-
nies involved in nuclear businesses, were down by
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−7.71% and −5.35%. On the contrary, daily re-
turns of the S&P Global Clean Energy Index were
up by 4.55% and 4.63% on the same days. This
index consists of 30 companies that are involved
in clean energy-related businesses. Figure 1 shows
the effect of the nuclear disaster in Fukushima-
Daiichi on both global indices. However, these
indices pool stocks from very different markets,
with the political convictions regarding nuclear
power varying widely between nations. This study
examines the impact of theFukushima-Daiichi dis-
aster separately on both a country and company
level. Our data provide stock prices of nuclear
power producers and alternative energy firms in
France, Germany, Japan, and the United States.
These countries formed themarkets with the high-
est nuclear power output in 2009. Furthermore,
we analyze the market efficiency throughout the
period subsequent to the disaster.
There are several studies in finance literature,
which focus upon the consequences of nuclear
disasters such as the Three Mile Island (TMI) ac-
cident in March 1979 and the Chernobyl disaster
in April 1986 on stock prices.
Bowen, Castanias, and Daley (1983) studied the
effect of the TMI accident on daily returns of
U.S. utility stocks. They found statistically sig-
nificant, negative abnormal returns, in particular
for firms with current or planned nuclear relations
as well as a statistically significant long-run, up-
ward shift in both residual risk and market risk
after March 1979. Furthermore, firms with high
nuclear commitments exhibit larger declines in eq-
uity prices than non-nuclear firms. Likewise, Hill
and Schneeweis (1983) considered the effect of the
TMI accident on the stock returns of U.S. public
utility firms. They used monthly market data and
found statistically significant, negative abnormal
returns in the month of the TMI incident and the
following month for nuclear utilities by applying
single and two index models. The losses suffered
by non-nuclear firms, however, are statistically not
significant. Barrett, Heuson, and Kolb (1986) ana-
lyzed the effects of the TMI incident on bond risk
premia in the public utility industry and revealed a
statistically significant increase in the risk premia
attached to all U.S. electric utility bonds subse-
quent to the TMI accident. In particular, firmswith
nuclear-generating capacity show a larger step-up
in the risk premia following the TMI event than
non-nuclear utility bonds.
Fields and Janjigian (1989) studied the U.S. public
electric utility stock price reaction to the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant disaster. During a 20-day pe-
riod after the accident, they found statistically sig-
nificant, negative daily abnormal returns for all
firms. In particular, nuclear-related firms exhib-
ited greater losses than non-nuclear firms. In con-
trast to Bowen, Castanias, and Daley (1983) who
considered TMI, Fields and Janjigian (1989) did
not find statistically significant changes in system-
atic risk, total risk, or market risk. Another study,
which researched whether daily stock returns of
U.S. electric utilities reacted to the Chernobyl nu-
clear catastrophe is the one by Kalra, Henderson
jr., and Raines (1993), who grouped firms by their
nuclear capacity. Although all groups delivered
statistically significant, negative reactions on the
Chernobyl accident, the mixed group with a nu-
clear capacity of 10%--20%performedworst. Aktar
(2005) studied the impact of the nuclear accident
in Chernobyl on equity prices of U.S. electric utili-
ties and provided a comparison with the impact of
TMI. He found a relatively greater impact on firms
with a larger degree of nuclear exposure after the
Chernobyl accident as well as for firms already
experiencing problems with the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission, in addition to firms with nuclear
power plants under construction. Furthermore,
he identified that negative stock price movements
following TMI are greater for firms with plants lo-
cated in densely populated areas. The same result
does not apply to the Chernobyl accident.
Following this body of literature, we apply the
event study methodology to investigate the impact
of the nuclear disaster of Fukushima-Daiichi on
daily stock returns in a five-week period following
March 11, 2011. Our contribution to prior event
studies on nuclear disasters is threefold.
Firstly, our data consist of a broader sample with
respect to two dimensions: On the one hand,
we examine the differences concerning the im-
pact on stock prices between two distinct groups.
While former studies are pooling all utility stocks,
we separately consider two sub-samples, namely
nuclear-related companies, on the one hand, and
firms mainly involved in alternative energies on
the other. Our analysis confirms the results from
prior studies that a nuclear accident yields a de-
cline of utility stock prices for the nuclear energy
sub-sample. However, we also present strong evi-
dence that alternative energy stocks benefit from
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a nuclear accident. On the other hand, we review
hypotheses in an international context regarding
four countries. Therewith, we extend the insights
provided by prior studies, which contain results on
the reaction of the stock prices in the United States
only.
Secondly, while prior literature relied on a simple
marketmodel, our empirical approach implements
a Fama-French model for stock returns. This al-
lows us to draw conclusions that are independent
of possible size effects in the sample of firms.
Furthermore, instead of testing each firm individ-
ually for abnormal returns, we test our respec-
tive country-wise and sector-wise sub-samples for
jointly significant abnormal returns.
Thirdly, to the best of our knowledge, we com-
pose the first study to consider the effects of the
Fukushima-Daiichi accident.While the nuclear ac-
cidents in TMI and Chernobyl induced significant
reactions in U.S. utility stock prices, we find only
weak evidence for similar reactions to the Fukushi-
ma-Daiichi accident in theUnitedStates.However,
we present strong reactions in France, Germany,
and Japan suggesting a possible forthcoming pol-
icy change in these countries.
Section 2 outlines the methodology regarding the
stock return model and the hypotheses tests in
this event study, whereas further technical details
are given in Appendix A. We explain our research
design and the sample selection in section 3. A de-
tailed discussion of our results follows in section 4.
2 Methodology
Primarily, we are interested in assessing the mar-
ket efficiency following the Fukushima-Daiichi nu-
clear disaster. Pursuing the stream of literature
founded by the seminal paper of Fama, Fisher,
Jensen, and Roll (1969), we employ a traditional
event study methodology to investigate the semi-
strong form of market efficiency in the sense that
stock prices adjust very rapidly to information,
which had newly been made publicly available.
The analysis relies on the assumption that there
have been no confounding effects besides the ones
thatwill be considered separately (McWilliamsand
Siegel 1997). We use the following notation for the
time windows of a stock return model and a com-
pletely unexpected event. Let t0 be the beginning
of the estimation period [t0, t1 − 1], t1 be the event
date, t2 be the end of the event window [t1, t2], and
t3 be the end of the post-event window [t2 + 1, t3].
2.1 Fama-French stock return model
As MacKinlay (1997) pointed out, a multi-factor
model should be considered in event studies when
analyzing firms that are all members of the same
industry. Therefore, in contrast to prior event stud-
ies on nuclear disasters that rely on the CAPM, we
apply the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model. It incorporates two additional risk factors,
which is relevant for our sample because the size of
nuclear and alternative energy firms varies widely.
For a single asset, let
Rt = β0 + βMMt + βSMBSMBt +(1)
βHMLHMLt + εt,
for t = t0, . . . , t3, where Rt is the return on a
specific firm (throughout the paper, we denote
the discrete return of an asset net of the risk-free
rate simply as return), Mt is the return on the
market portfolio, SMBt is the return on the small-
minus-big portfolio, HMLt is the return on the
high-minus-low portfolio, and εt represents the
excess return on day t. For all t, equation (1) can
be written in matrix form as
(2) R = Xβ + ε,
where the design matrix
X = [1 |M |SMB |HML] ∈ R(t3−t0+1)×4.
2.2 Event study
To include the effect of the event, we introduce
dummy variables Dt ∈ Rt3−t0+1, t = t1, . . . , t3,
which are defined as indicator vectors with a
one in row t and zeros elsewhere. Notice that
according to Acharya (1993), the dummy variable
approach is equivalent to the standard two-step
procedure employed in many event studies. Let
D = [Dt1 | · · · |Dt3] ∈ R(t3−t0+1)×(t3−t1+1). Therewith
we extend equation (2) to
(3) R = Xβ +Dγ + ε,
where γ ∈ Rt3−t1+1 indicates the abnormal returns
in the event window and in the post-event window.
For a set of multiple assets, define analogously
to equation (3) the multivariate regression model
(MVRM)
(4) Ri = Xβi +Dγi + εi, i = 1, . . . ,g,
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where g denotes the total number of firms. These
firms comprise nuclear companies, denoted in the
index set N , and alternative energy companies,
denoted in the index set A, such that {1, . . . ,g} =
N ∪ A.
2.3 Hypothesis development
Given the fact that abnormal returns were docu-
mented for nuclear and non-nuclear utility firms
during the first two major nuclear accidents in
TMI (Bowen, Castanias, and Daley 1983; Hill and
Schneeweis 1983) andChernobyl (Fields andJanji-
gian 1989; Kalra, Henderson jr., and Raines 1993),
we establish similar hypotheses for the Fukushi-
ma-Daiichi disaster. Normally, a nuclear accident
raises the general awareness of the possible risks
of nuclear energy. Supervisory authorities over-
haul existing safety procedures, which may lead
to costly retrofits in nuclear power plants. Thus,
we expect a decline in the stock prices of nuclear
energy firms after a nuclear disaster. Moreover,
policymakers might launch programs to expedite
the transition to non-nuclear, alternative energies.
Such programs should increase the demand for al-
ternative energies. Therefore, we expect the stock
prices of alternative energy firms to rise in expec-
tation of such programs. This yields the following
testable hypotheses.
H1: The event doesnot affect the abnormal returns
of thenuclear energy stocks in the (post-)event
window.
H2: The event doesnot affect the abnormal returns
of the alternative energy stocks in the (post-)
event window.
H3: The event does not affect the cumulative ab-
normal returns of the nuclear energy stocks in
the (post-)event window.
H4: The event does not affect the cumulative ab-
normal returnsof the alternative energy stocks
in the (post-)event window.
We test these hypotheses individually for each
country on each day in the event window and
the post-event window. Significant abnormal and
cumulative abnormal returns during the event
window would suggest that the market expects
a change in policy towards non-nuclear energies.
Moreover, finding significant abnormal returns in
the event window, while finding no significant ab-
normal returns in the post-event window would
indicate a rapid adjustment of the stocks’ prices
to the new regime and thus support the concept
of market efficiency. Technical details on the tests
are provided in Appendix A.
3 Research design
3.1 Choice of window lengths and
three-factor model estimation
Although many event studies use a relatively
short estimation period to avoid incorporating
confounding events, we follow the event studies
on nuclear disasters of Bowen, Castanias, and
Daley (1983); Hill and Schneeweis (1983) which
use an estimation period of three and two years,
respectively. Hence, we estimate the model for a
period of three years commencing on January 4,
2008 and ending on March 10, 2011. Moreover,
given the extreme bull market after the financial
crisis of 2007--2009, we consider betas based on
a shorter estimation period to be non-stationary.
We consider two event windows when testing
for short-run and medium-run market reactions
in the abnormal returns of selected energy
companies. The event window commences on
March 14, 2011 (i.e., the first trading day after the
disaster) and spans a period of five trading days.
Further, we define a post-event window from
March 21, 2011 to April 15, 2011.
We use Thomson Reuters Datastream as our
primary data source. To be precise, we use the
datatype Price Adjusted (P) as the stock price,
Market Value (MV) as the market value, and
Common/Shareholder Equity (WC03501) as
the book value. In order to compute the returns
of the Fama-French portfolios, we consider
all domestic equities with the aforementioned
datatypes available that are listed on the NYSE
Euronext for France (295 stocks), Börse Frankfurt
for Germany (230 stocks), Tokyo Stock Exchange
for Japan (2,264 stocks), and NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ for the United States (3,876 stocks),
respectively. The selected stocks account for a total
market capitalization of €1.242 trillion (France),
€907 billion (Germany), ¥309.522 trillion
(Japan), and $14.022 trillion (USA), respectively,
as of December 31, 2010. For each of the four
markets, we compute themarket portfolio returns,
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the small-minus-big (SMB) portfolio returns and
the high-minus-low (HML) portfolio returns.
Similar to Fama and French (1993), we rebalance
the SMB and HML portfolio on June 30 each
year. In order to consistently define the portfolios
in all markets, we use the median of the market
capitalization of all stocks in the respective
market as of June 30 as the threshold for the
SMB portfolio, and the 30% and 70% quantile
of the stocks ordered by the book-to-market
equity as of December 31 of the previous year
as the thresholds for the HML portfolio. When
comparing the factors of our U.S. sub-sample
to the factors published on Kenneth French’s
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data_library.html), we obtain
a correlation of 99.9% for the market portfolio
returns, 91.0% for the SMB portfolio returns,
and 79.5% for the HML portfolio returns.
Although the correlations for the SMB and HML
portfolios are still high, the decrease compared
to the correlation of the market portfolio can
be explained: Kenneth French uses the median
market capitalization of the NYSE stocks only as
the threshold for the SMB portfolio, while we use
the median of all U.S. stocks. As a proxy for the
risk-free rates, we take the one-month EURIBOR
for France and Germany, the one-month Gensaki
T-Bill rate for Japan, and the four-week U.S. T-Bill
rate for the United States.
3.2 Nuclear and alternative companies
sample selection
We consciously choose our sample in respect to
several criteria that ensure a robust estimation of
the stock return model. Moreover, we do not con-
sider supplying industries to guarantee a very low
international linkage of the four different country
samples.
Because there is no category for nuclear companies
inDatastream,we select all publicly traded compa-
nies operating nuclear power plants with a capac-
ity of at least 1,000 megawatts that are domestic
to their respective market. However, we exclude
EnBW for Germany which had only approximately
1% of its stocks in free float in March 2011. Ta-
ble B-1 in Appendix B lists the companies and their
respective nuclear power capacity.
For the alternative energy firms,weuse all stocks in
ThomsonReuters Datastream,which are classified
as Alternative Energy. However, we filter out all
illiquid stockswithmore than90days of no trading
reported in the estimationperiod, or five dayswith-
out trading reported in the event windows. This af-
fects 3 firms (France), 10 firms (Germany), 0 firms
(Japan), and 43 firms (USA). Afterwards, there re-
main: 1 stock (France), 13 stocks (Germany), 1 stock
(Japan), and 13 stocks (USA). Finally, we filter out
all stocks for which the Fama-French model fits
with a coefficient of determination of less than
0.15. The rationale behind this is that a small R2
value indicates an inferior fit of the Fama-French
model. Notice that the event study methodology
compares the actual returns with the predicted re-
turns by the Fama-French model. Therefore, no
meaningful forecast of the return is possible for
stocks exhibiting a poor fit of the Fama-French
model. This is the case for five stocks in Germany
and six stocks in the United States. The remaining
stocks are listed in Table B-1 in Appendix B.
3.3 Confounding events
Foster (1980) suggested several approaches to pre-
vent an impact of confounding events occurring in
the event window. Following him, we eliminate a
firm from the sample on the days of confound-
ing events. Technically, we ignore the respective
abnormal returns on these days (i.e., to gain an
unbiased estimate of the cumulative abnormal re-
turn for the individual companies) and exclude the
company on the respective days when calculating
mean ARs and CARs. Table B-2 contains a list of
all confounding events affecting the firms of the
sample in the period from March 11 to April 15,
2011.
4 Results and discussion
The three key results of our empirical study of the
Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear disaster are: (1) the
unanticipated event is incorporated in the stock
prices of selected nuclear and alternative energy
companies within a few days, thus supporting the
concept of semi-strong market efficiency, (2) nu-
clear energy companies have significant negative
cumulative abnormal returns while alternative en-
ergy companies show a positive reaction, and
(3) the majority of abnormal returns in the post-
event window are caused by confounding events.
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4.1 Fama-French model
We estimate the full multivariate regressionmodel
in equation (A.1) separately for each country using
its specific Fama-French portfolios, as described in
the previous section. Table 1 presents descriptive
statistics upon the asset pricing model fit during
the estimation period from January 4, 2008 to
March 10, 2011. Our selected alternative energy
companies are generally riskier than the nuclear
companies in all countries. The nuclear energy
companies have a market beta lower than one,
and a negative, but relatively low exposure to the
small-minus-big (SMB) factor. However, the alter-
native energy companies display a high positive
exposure to the SMB factor. These companies have
a much smaller market capitalization than the nu-
clear companies and are therefore subject to the
size effect (i.e., smaller stocks have higher average
returns). Comparing the exposure to the high-
minus-low (HML) factor, we find that the nuclear
stocks have lower factor loadings than the alterna-
tive energy stocks in all markets except Japan. This
is commensuratewith the explanation of Fama and
French (1995), being that stronger firms generally
exhibit lower HML factors. Moreover, the model
generally fits the nuclear stocks better than the
alternative energy stocks.
Figure 2 exhibits the estimated residual correla-
tions of all firms in each country. The nuclear
energy firms exhibit an average correlation of 0.62
(Germany), 0.72 (Japan), and 0.44 (USA). For the
alternative energy firms, the average correlations
are 0.18 (Germany) and 0.14 (USA). The average
correlations between the nuclear and alternative
energy firms are 0.04 (France), 0.03 (Germany),
−0.01 (Japan), and −0.03 (USA). The joint hy-
pothesis tests in the following section account for
these correlations within both sectors.
4.2 Abnormal returns
On March 14, the first trading day after the dan-
ger in Fukushima-Daiichi became imminent, the
nuclear energy firms in France, Germany, and
Japan show significant negative abnormal returns
(Table 2), whereas we do not find significant ab-
normal returns for the nuclear companies in the
United States. Notice that we present the mean of
the abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnor-
mal returns (CAR) in this table. Since performance
distributions often tend to be skewed, we addition-
ally provide the results for themedian AR and CAR
in the Appendix (Table B-6). Yet, the significance
levels are not based on testing the hypothesis of
zero mean (cumulative) abnormal returns, but on
jointly zero (cumulative) abnormal returns (joint
hypothesis tests in section 2.3 and Appendix A).
We provide detailed results on a company level
for each country in Appendix B (Tables B-3--B-5).
The mean cumulative abnormal returns of the nu-
clear energy firms in all countries remain negative
during the event window. However, the CAR of
the U.S. nuclear stocks is not significant at the
end of the event window (March 18, 2011), and
the French and German CARs on nuclear stocks
are merely slightly significant at a 10% level. Only
the Japanese nuclear stocks show jointly signifi-
cant non-zero CARs at a 1% level with a mean of
−9.9%. As expected, we see an inverted effect for
the alternative energy companies. They profit in
all countries except the United States in the event
window.Whengrouping the alternative companies
into their subsegments (cf. Table B-1), the CARs at
the end of the event window are the highest for the
solar energy producers in France (13.4%) and in
Germany (52.6%). To sum up, in our sample we
find an expected short-term negative reaction for
the majority of the nuclear stocks and note a posi-
tive performance for the alternative companies.
To study medium-term effects of the events on the
abnormal returnswe consider apost-eventwindow
of four weeks commencing onMarch 21, 2011. The
significant abnormal returns in France for EDF on
April 5 and 6 (−3.1% and −2.7%) were most likely
due to an announcement of the French govern-
ment concerning their low energy price strategy.
Otherwise, we did not notice medium-term effects
on the nuclear and the alternative company in the
French sample. The CARs of the German nuclear
producers are not jointly significantly non-zero in
the post-event window (Table 2). However, we find
many highly significant abnormal returns for the
eight German alternative companies in our sample
(Table B-3). Nevertheless, most of these can be ex-
plained. In particular, the German solar producers
had high CARs during the event window. There-
fore, we conclude that the significant negative ab-
normal returns at the beginning of the post-event
window are mostly due to profit-taking. Later, we
found several confounding events (Table B-2). For
example, on March 27 the Green Party won the
election in the German federal state of Baden-
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Table 1: Fama-French three-factor model
Panel (a): Nuclear Stocks
Factor France Germany Japan USA
βM 0.91 (0.00) 0.81 (0.13) 0.40 (0.04) 0.72 (0.15)
βSMB −0.01 (0.00) −0.14 (0.05) −0.07 (0.05) −0.34 (0.14)
βHML −1.00 (0.00) −1.01 (0.17) 0.69 (0.10) −0.42 (0.17)
R2 0.54 (0.00) 0.59 (0.03) 0.43 (0.16) 0.49 (0.09)
Panel (b): Alternative Energy Stocks
Factor France Germany Japan USA
βM 1.13 (0.00) 1.87 (0.51) 1.17 (0.00) 1.49 (0.38)
βSMB 1.14 (0.00) 0.99 (0.54) 1.18 (0.00) 0.74 (0.39)
βHML −0.00 (0.00) −0.84 (0.29) 0.50 (0.00) −0.13 (0.53)
R2 0.15 (0.00) 0.28 (0.10) 0.39 (0.00) 0.26 (0.09)
We display the mean Fama-French factors for nuclear and alternative energy firms in the respective markets and their standard
deviation (in parentheses). We also list the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of the (non-adjusted) R2 values of the
three-factor model in the different markets. The estimation period commences on January 4, 2008 and ends on March 10, 2011.
























































































































Correlation matrices of all nuclear and alternative energy stock residual returns in each country estimated by the MVRM for the
period January 4, 2008 through March 10, 2011. White represents negative and zero correlations, black represents a correlation
of one. Nuclear stocks are plotted in the upper-left corner and alternative energy stocks in the lower-right corner. The nuclear
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Table 2: Mean daily ARs and mean daily CARs of nuclear and alternative energy companies
Nuclear Stocks Alternative Energy Stocks
Date France Germany Japan USA France Germany Japan USA








March 14 −3.1* −3.1* −4.7** −4.7** −6.4*** −6.4*** −1.0 −1.0 5.0* 5.0* 19.3*** 19.3*** 2.6 2.6 −1.4 −1.4
March 15 1.3 −1.8 −1.0 −5.7** −9.8*** −16.2*** −1.3 −2.3 11.4*** 16.4*** 37.1*** 56.4*** 5.0** 7.6** 3.8 2.4
March 16 −1.2 −2.9 0.5 −5.2** 1.4*** −14.9*** 0.0 −2.3 −1.0 15.4*** −14.5*** 42.0*** −2.2 5.4 1.4 3.8
March 17 −1.5 −4.4 −0.2 −5.3* 3.4*** −11.5*** −1.1 −3.4 −1.4 14.0** 0.7 42.7*** 2.4 7.7* −3.9 −0.1










March 21 3.1* 3.1* −0.6 −0.6 † † −0.1 −0.1 −1.5 −1.5 −8.7** −8.7** † † −0.4 −0.3
March 22 −1.2 1.9 1.2 0.6 1.9*** 1.9*** 0.4 0.4 −1.1 −2.6 −0.8* −9.4** −2.2 −2.2 1.3 1.0
March 23 1.1 3.0 0.4 1.0 −1.1** 0.8*** −0.1 0.2 0.8 −1.7 8.0* −1.4 0.3 −2.0 −1.4 −0.5
March 24 0.2 3.2 −0.9 0.2 −3.8*** −3.1 −0.5 −0.3 −0.2 −1.9 −5.3 −6.7 1.0 −1.0 −0.2 −0.7
March 25 −0.3 3.0 0.2 0.4 −1.1** −4.1** −0.2 −0.5 −1.9 −3.8 1.6 −5.1 3.0* 2.0 −1.0 −1.7
March 28 −0.1 2.8 −0.8 −0.4 −2.8*** −7.0*** −0.3 −0.7 2.1 −1.7 2.0 −4.3 0.6 2.6 2.3 0.6
March 29 0.6 3.5 −0.9 −1.3 −3.5*** −10.5*** 0.3 −0.4 −0.5 −2.2 −1.1 −4.7 1.7 4.3 0.8 1.3
March 30 1.4 4.9 0.4 −0.9 −3.3*** −13.7*** 0.8 0.4 0.3 −2.0 −2.2 −5.6 −0.7 3.6 −0.8 0.5
March 31 −1.0 3.9 −0.4 −1.3 −2.1 −15.9*** −0.1 0.3 −1.5 −3.5 −0.6 −6.1 −1.2 2.4 −2.0 −1.4
April 1 −0.8 3.1 −0.6 −1.9 −3.0** −18.8*** 0.3 0.5 0.0 −3.5 −3.2 −8.5 1.9 4.3 −0.6 −1.9
April 4 0.3 3.4 1.0 −0.9 −0.6 −19.4*** −0.1 0.4 −0.1 −3.6 0.5 −8.2 0.6 5.0 −3.8 −5.2
April 5   0.8 −0.1 −2.8*** −22.2*** −0.4 0.0 −0.2 −3.8 −2.8 −10.6 2.2 7.1 −0.2 −5.4
April 6   0.3 0.2 −1.8** −24.0*** 0.9 1.0 0.3 −3.5 −0.6 −11.2 −0.3 6.8 −0.0 −5.4
April 7 0.2 3.6 0.9 1.2 3.7** −20.4*** −0.0 0.9 1.1 −2.5 −0.5 −11.7 1.6 8.3 0.3 −5.1
April 8 † † 0.5 1.7 3.4*** −17.0*** −0.0 0.9 † † −1.1 −12.8 −0.4 8.0 −0.1 −5.2
April 11 2.5 6.1 0.7 2.3 4.4*** −12.5*** −1.2 −0.3 1.2 −1.3 −0.7 −13.6 −1.3 6.6 0.3 −4.9
April 12 0.2 6.4 0.5 2.8 −1.9*** −14.4*** −0.0 −0.3 −0.1 −1.4 1.3 −12.3 1.4 8.1 −1.3 −6.2
April 13 −0.7 5.7 −0.1 2.7 † † 0.1 −0.2 −3.2 −4.6 −1.3 −13.6 0.0 8.1 2.0 −4.2
April 14 −1.4 4.3 −0.4 2.3 −0.5 −14.9*** 0.5 0.3 0.2 −4.4 −0.7 −14.3 −1.8 6.3 −1.7 −5.9
April 15 −0.6 3.7 −1.2 1.2 −0.4*** −15.3*** 1.0 1.3 0.5 −3.9 −2.0 −16.2 −0.1 6.2 −3.3 −9.2
Mean daily abnormal returns (in regular letters) and mean daily cumulative abnormal returns (in bold letters) of nuclear and alternative energy companies in the respective
markets. All values are given in percentage. *, **, *** denote joint significant (cumulative) abnormal returns at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, corresponding to the hypotheses
given in section 2.3. The p-values (not reported separately) are calculated using a MVRM and the HWZ bootstrap method as described in Hein and Westfall (2004) with 100,000
bootstrap samples each. Confounding events according to Table B-2 are excluded from the analysis and marked with , holidays are marked with †.
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Württemberg, which had a significant positive ef-
fect on the solar energy companies. The CARs for
the Japanese nuclear companies are jointly signif-
icantly different from zero at a 1% level with a
mean of −15.3% at the end of the post-event win-
dow (Table 2). Of course the mean is influenced
by the abnormal returns of TEPCO, with the me-
dian being −10.1% (Table B-6). However, we find
several significant negative abnormal returns for
the other nuclear stocks (Table B-4). We identified
only one confounding event in the post-event win-
dow for Japan. On April 13, 2011 there was news
that TEPCO’s liability would be capped while other
utilities could have been asked to cover on some
of the compensation costs. As a result, we find sig-
nificant negative returns for all Japanese nuclear
stocks except for TEPCO on this particular day
(Table B-4). For the United States, the post-event
window consists of only two significant abnormal
returns for the nuclear companies, both being due
to confounding events. Furthermore, seven signif-
icant negative abnormal returns for the alternative
energy companies exist, amongst which five were
caused by confounding events. Therefore, we do
not see medium-term effects for the U.S. compa-
nies in our sample in the post-event window. In
summary, one can conclude that the majority of
abnormal returns in the post-event window are
explained by confounding events. Jointly signif-
icantly non-zero CARs remain in the post-event
window only for the Japanese nuclear producers.
Longer-lasting effects upon energy companies in
France, Germany and the United States cannot be
inferred from the analyzed market data.
Comparing the mean CARs at the end of the event
window and the post-event window, we find that
the strong reactions of the returns one week af-
ter the event are partially offset after five weeks
in France, Germany, and the United States. This
would indicate an overreaction in the stock prices
during the first few days following the Fukushi-
ma-Daiichi disaster. However, notice that the vast
majority of the ARs and CARs of the reversal in
the post-event window are not significant. In con-
trast, most of the significant abnormal returns
occur within the first two trading days after the
event. Therefore, the rapid adjustment of the stock
prices supports the efficient market hypothesis in
its semi-strong form in all countries except Japan.
This is plausible because the Japanese companies
are influenced by aftershocks following the initial
earthquake, and by the discussion about the distri-
bution of the compensation costs to other utilities
and the Japanese government.
4.3 Robustness checks
Togauge the robustness of our resultswe examined
several alternative specifications of the model. In
a first check we reduced the size of the estimation
period and set t0 = January 4, 2009. This did not
materially affect the estimates of the coefficients of
interest and we again found similar results for the
significance of the (cumulative) abnormal returns.
Furthermore, we re-analyzed the Japanese nuclear
sample excluding TEPCO as the directly affected
company in Fukushima-Daiichi. In this case, the
mean CARs remain negative in Japan on all days
with −3.0% at the end of the event window and
−8.9% at the end of the post-event window. How-
ever, only the CARs at the end of the event window
remain jointly significantly non-zero at a 1% level,
whereas the joint significance of the CARs at the
end of the post-event window diminishes. More-
over, we re-evaluated our study using logarithmic
returns instead of discrete returns.While the inter-
pretation of the mean logarithmic CARs is difficult
(Dissanaike and Le Fur 2003), we did not detect
any material differences in the results. Finally, we
wish to point out that the bootstrap procedure
in section 2.3 and Appendix A already accounts
for the non-normality and possible heteroscedas-
ticity due to GARCH effects of the residuals and
thus leads to robust significance levels in the joint
hypotheses tests.
5 Conclusion
This study provides profound insights into the ef-
fects of the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster on selected
nuclear and alternative energy stocks in four differ-
ent countries. For the Japanese nuclear stocks, we
note a distinct increase in volatility following the
event, which implies a high amount of uncertainty
about future policy implications. In contrast, the
French and German stock prices adjusted rapidly
after the event, indicating that the market expects
a change in policy towards alternative energies.
Finally, our findings suggest that the market does
not expect a forthcoming policy departure in the
United States.
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Appendix A: Model estimation and
joint hypothesis tests
The standard approach employed in many event
studies ismerely to examine themeanof the abnor-
mal returns of all assets under consideration (e.g.,
Harrington and Shrider 2007), i.e., to consider the
mean of equation (4) for i = 1, . . . ,g. However,
we cannot assume a priori that all nuclear and
alternative energy firms are affected in the same
way because the portion of nuclear power in the
firm’s generation mix varies widely between the
nuclear energy firms. Furthermore, the alternative
energy firms are engaged in different subsegments.
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According to Binder (1998), the benefit of this
framework is twofold: Firstly, it empowers the
testing ofmore sophisticated joint hypotheses than
just the average return on all assets. Secondly, it
allows one to directly employ cross-sectional cor-
relations in the test statistics, which is of particular
importance in our case, where all firms share the
same industry and the same event window.
Since the stackedMVRM in equation (A.1) is a spe-
cial case in the class of seemingly unrelated regres-
sions (SUR), traditional parametrical methodolo-
gies for testing joint hypotheses in SURmodels can
bedirectly appliedandarediscussed, e.g., inBinder
(1985). All these methods rely on the assumption
that the first t1 − 1 rows (i.e., the rows corre-
sponding to the estimation period) of the residuals
ε = [ε1 | · · · | εg] are independent and identically
distributed, whereas the observations within each
rowmay be cross-sectionally correlated. However,
Hein and Westfall (2004) pointed out that these
tests are not robust to non-normality of the residu-
als, even for an arbitrarily large estimation period,
and propose using bootstrap methods instead.
They showed that bootstrapping adapts itself to
non-normal characteristics of the data, and is even
marginally robust to non-i.i.d. data. In an empiri-
cal study, Hein andWestfall (2004) demonstrated
that bootstrapping procedures are capable of cap-
turing AR, ARCH, and GARCH effect very well.
Hence, we follow suit and use the HWZ bootstrap
method as described in Hein and Westfall (2004)
for calculating p-values. In particular, this method
is a data-based bootstrap of the test statistic
S=(Aδˆ)′(A(Ξ′(Σˆ⊗It2−t0+1)−1Ξ)−1A′)−1(Aδˆ),
where A is a linear hypotheses test matrix, Ξ the
design matrix from equation (A.1), δˆ the estima-
tion of the β and γ vector from equation (A.1), I
the identity matrix, ⊗ the Kronecker product, and
Σˆ the estimated covariance matrix of the resid-
uals εi, i = 1, . . . ,g, from equation (A.1). Notice
that the test statistic S is already adjusted for
cross-sectional correlations of the securities by in-
corporating the estimated covariance matrix Σˆ.
Therefore, we do not require any crude depen-
dence adjustments of the (cumulative) abnormal
returns.
Finally, we describe the hypothesis test matrices
A1, . . . ,A4 corresponding to the four hypotheses
H1, . . . ,H4. Formally, for a day τ ∈ [t1, t2], we can
re-write the hypotheses from section 2.3 as
H1: (γi)τ = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
H2: (γi)τ = 0 for all i ∈ A,
H3:
∑τ
t=t1(γi)τ = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
H4:
∑τ
t=t1(γi)τ = 0 for all i ∈ A,
and similar for τ ∈ [t2 + 1, t3]. Technically speak-
ing, we now define the test matrix A1(τ) corre-
sponding to hypothesis H1 for a day τ ∈ [t1, t3]
as a |N | × |δ| matrix, where |δ| denotes the size
of the vector δ and |N | the number of nuclear
energy firms, with a one in every row n ∈ N at
column (n − 1)(t3 − t1 + 5) + τ − t1 + 4 and zeros
elsewhere. The hypothesis test matrix A2(τ) cor-
responding to hypothesis H2 is constructed simi-
larly. Finally, the hypotheses test matrices for the
cumulative hypothesesH3 andH4 are constructed
as A3(τ) =
∑τ
t=t1 A1(t) and A4(τ) =
∑τ
t=t1 A2(t)
when testing cumulative abnormal returns in the





t=t2+1A2(t) when testing in the post-
event window.
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Appendix B: Tables
This Appendix contains tables which present the companies selected in this study (Table B-1), the
confounding events considered (Table B-2), and the detailed daily abnormal returns for Germany, Japan,
and the United States (Tables B-3--B-5).
Table B-1: Nuclear holding companies and alternative energy companies
France
EDF Électricité de France 63,130




C3O Centrosolar Group S
CTN Centrotherm Photovoltaics S
CGY Conergy S
E2B EOP Biodiesel B
RPW Repower Systems W




TE Tokyo Elec. Power Co. 16,779
KE Kansai Elec. Power Co. 9,284
UY Kyushu Elec. Power Co. 5,004
CL Chubu Elec. Power Co. 3,360
UL Tohoku Elec. Power Co. 3,157
HY Hokkaido Elec. Power Co. 1,966
SK Shikoku Elec. Power Co. 1,922
HP Hokuriku Elec. Power Co. 1,613
CU Chugoku Elec. Power Co. 1,228
EBAR Ebara Jitsugyo Co. H, W
USA
EXC Exelon Corp. 16,715
ETR Entergy Corp. 10,129
D Dominion Resources 5,691
FE FirstEnergy Corp. 3,862
PGN Progress Energy 3,771
SO Southern Co. 3,644
PEG Public Service Ent. Grp. 3,611
PCG PG&E Corp. 2,240
EIX Edison International 2,236
PPL PPL Corp. 2,093
AEP American Elec. Power Co. 2,069
CEG Constellation Energy Grp. 1,939
XEL Xcel Energy 1,668
AEE Ameren Corp. 1,190
PNW Pinnacle West Capital Corp. 1,147
NRG NRG Energy 1,126
DTE DTE Energy Co. 1,122
ASTI Ascent Solar Technologies S
CSIQ Canadian Solar S
HEV Ener1 F
ENER Energy Conversion Devices S, F
HOKU Hoku S
PLUG Plug Power F
RZTI Raser Technologies G
Nuclear holding companies (in upright letters) with a capacity greater than 1,000 megawatts (MW) and alternative energy
companies (in italic letters) by country. The figures indicate the nuclear capacity (in megawatts). The alternative energy firms
are classified into solar energy (S), hydropower (H), wind energy (W), fuel cell technology (F), geothermal electric power
plants (G) and biodiesel (B).
Sources: Annual reports of EDF, E.ON, and RWE (2010) for France and Germany; International Atomic Energy Agency (2010)
for Japan; Nuclear Energy Institute (2011) for USA; Thomson Reuters Datastream for alternative energy firms.
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Table B-2: Confounding events during the event and post-event window.
Date Company Confounding Event
March 11 ENER Company announcement regarding bad revenue guidance in the second
half of 2011 on March 11.
March 28--March 30 CTN, CGY,
SFX, SOO,
SJK
Green Party wins the election in the German federal state of Baden-
Württemberg on March 27.
March 29 PLUG Inter RAO UES acquires 82 percent of Plug Power.
March 31--April 4 E2B Takeover of EOP Biodiesel on March 31, 2011.
April 1--April 4 ASTI Company announcement regarding a change in corporate strategy.
Subsequently, the CEO resigns from his position.
April 1--April 5 SJK Insolvency proceedings; all outstanding accounts have to be settled by
March 29, 2011.
April 4 RPW Takeover intention by the Indian company Suzlon.
April 5--April 6 EDF Announcement by the French government concerning their low energy
price strategy.
April 5--April 7 RZTI Default on the annual interest payment of $2.2million on April 1, 2011.
RYTI cannot provide any assurance that the payment will bemade at all.
April 12 PPL PPL Corp. announces that it has priced its concurrent offerings of
common stock and equity units at a reference price of $25.30 per share.
April 12 EIX Request for $64 million for a study to re-evaluate the seismic and
tsunami conditions of its San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
April 13 TE, KE, UY,
CL, UL, HY,
SK, HP, CU
Besides TEPCO, several other nuclear energy firms have to render
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Table B-3: Daily abnormal returns of nuclear and alternative energy companies in Germany
Nuclear Stocks Alternative Energy Stocks
Date E.ON RWE C3O CTN CGY E2B RPW SFX SOO SJK








March 14 −5.0*** −4.5** 14.7*** 12.9** 48.5*** −9.0* 9.0** 16.7*** 51.0*** 10.6*
March 15 −0.4 −1.6 7.1* 6.7* 109.2*** 6.7 1.1 13.0*** 57.0*** 96.4***
March 16 1.5 −0.5 −9.0** 3.2 −39.2*** −1.0 −0.6 −7.4* −32.0*** −29.7***
March 17 −0.8 0.5 −3.2 1.9 1.7 −2.8 0.4 0.5 3.7 3.2










March 21 −0.8 −0.4 −0.1 1.1 −21.0** −16.6** −0.3 −2.7 −13.4** −16.3**
March 22 1.5 0.9 −1.4 −3.0 −15.2** 2.9 1.1 0.1 −11.1** 20.4**
March 23 0.5 0.4 1.0 9.5** 17.7** 11.7** 5.4* 0.1 13.3** 5.5
March 24 −1.2 −0.6 −0.2 −2.6 −10.3* −1.7 −3.5 −2.2 −5.5 −16.1**
March 25 −0.2 0.6 −2.6 1.2 10.0* −12.3** −0.5 8.1* −0.7 9.5*
March 28 −1.2 −0.4 1.4 8.7** 8.5* 3.1 1.6 11.1** 14.0** 17.2**
March 29 −1.0 −0.8 4.6 −3.5 −8.7* −7.5 −0.3 2.0 −5.8 −8.3
March 30 0.4 0.4 −4.4 −8.0** −3.8 −2.8 0.6 −2.4 −1.1 −3.4
March 31 −0.2 −0.6 1.2 4.6 −0.6 53.2*** 1.6 −10.9** −0.0 0.1
April 1 −1.2 0.0 −1.3 −4.7 −2.5 −21.8*** −1.7 −3.6 −5.5 −11.7*
April 4 0.5 1.5 0.9 −0.1 −2.0 −12.3** 8.9** 2.6 1.0 18.9**
April 5 1.2 0.4 −1.9 1.5 −5.5 −3.6 −4.9 −2.4 −2.8 −9.7*
April 6 0.3 0.3 0.5 −2.5 −0.4 3.8 −0.4 0.1 −2.1 −3.8
April 7 1.1 0.8 −4.3 −1.6 4.5 −1.5 −0.8 −0.7 −2.9 3.2
April 8 0.5 0.4 −2.0 −2.5 −1.8 3.4 −1.1 −1.0 3.2 −7.0
April 11 0.8 0.6 −0.6 −1.0 0.9 −8.2 −0.2 0.7 −1.9 4.6
April 12 0.7 0.3 4.1 1.9 6.4 −2.6 1.0 −0.1 1.2 −2.0
April 13 −0.3 0.1 −4.2 0.3 −4.1 −7.3 0.4 −3.2 6.5 1.2
April 14 0.0 −0.8 −0.4 0.9 1.5 −7.2 −1.2 1.6 1.4 −2.1
April 15 −1.0 −1.3 −0.4 1.2 −1.9 2.1 −1.9 −3.5 −6.2 −5.1
All values are given in percent. The nuclear companies are listed in descending order by their megawatt capacities. *, **, *** denote significant abnormal returns at a 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively. The p-values (not reported separately) are calculated using a MVRM and the HWZ bootstrap method as described in Hein and Westfall (2004) with 100,000
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Table B-4: Daily abnormal returns of nuclear and alternative energy companies in Japan
Nuclear Stocks Alt. Energy Stocks
Date TE KE UY CL UL HY SK HP CU EBAR








March 14 −22.1*** −2.9* −4.7*** −2.6* −21.0*** −2.4* 0.2 −0.7 −1.4 2.6
March 15 −21.0*** −8.5*** −9.4*** −6.8*** −16.9*** −6.2*** −7.9*** −6.5*** −5.6*** 5.0**
March 16 −26.9*** 5.3*** 4.6*** 1.4 15.2*** 3.6** 3.3** 3.9*** 2.0* −2.2
March 17 −13.0*** 3.3** 3.3** 6.5*** 8.4*** 5.0*** 6.2*** 4.3*** 6.2*** 2.4










March 21 † † † † † † † † † †
March 22 13.5*** −2.4* −0.8 0.2 6.8*** −0.6 −1.2 0.6 0.4 −2.2
March 23 −4.4** 0.4 1.2 −1.6 −2.3* 0.3 −1.0 −1.4 −1.1 0.3
March 24 −14.1*** −1.7 −2.6* −1.9 −5.4*** −1.9 −1.8 −3.0** −1.9* 1.0
March 25 −6.3*** −0.5 0.0 −0.6 −0.5 −0.7 0.1 −0.6 −0.5 3.0*
March 28 −18.0*** −1.6 −0.4 −0.5 −1.1 −0.4 −1.2 −0.2 −2.0* 0.6
March 29 −18.1*** −3.4** −2.3* −1.6 −1.4 −1.5 −1.7 −0.7 −0.8 1.7
March 30 −18.2*** −1.0 −1.5 −2.4* −2.3* −0.8 −0.6 −0.0 −2.8** −0.7
March 31 −0.1 −2.6* −3.4** −1.7 −2.2* −1.5 −3.2** −2.7** −1.9* −1.2
April 1 −3.4** −1.3 −2.8** −2.7* −3.6** −4.3** −2.4* −5.0*** −1.1 1.9
April 4 −1.2 −0.5 −0.4 −1.1 −1.1 −0.2 −0.2 0.4 −0.9 0.6
April 5 −17.6*** −1.3 −0.7 0.0 −0.3 −1.7 −0.6 −2.2* −0.9 2.2
April 6 −6.3*** −0.8 −1.1 −0.7 −0.9 −2.1* −1.3 −1.7 −1.5 −0.3
April 7 0.9 5.3*** 5.7*** 6.0*** 2.6* 2.9** 3.4** 2.9** 3.2** 1.6
April 8 23.0*** 0.2 0.7 1.3 0.3 1.5 0.6 0.8 2.0* −0.4
April 11 19.2*** 2.5* 2.5* 3.2** 5.4*** 2.4* 1.3 1.4 2.0* −1.3
April 12 −9.4*** 0.4 −0.9 0.6 −3.2** −0.9 −1.0 −1.2 −1.2 1.4
April 13 11.4*** −4.2** −3.7** −3.3** −2.5* −2.1* −3.7** −2.2* −2.1* 0.0
April 14 −0.6 −1.0 −0.5 0.3 −0.6 −1.0 0.5 −0.2 −1.0 −1.8
April 15 −5.8*** 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.4 −0.0 −0.0 −0.5 −0.1 −0.1
All values are given in percentage. The nuclear companies are listed in descending order by their megawatt capacities. *, **, *** denote significant abnormal returns at a 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively. The p-values (not reported separately) are calculated using a MVRM and the HWZ bootstrap method as described in Hein and Westfall (2004) with




































 !  #%
Table B-5: Daily abnormal returns of nuclear and alternative energy companies in the USA
Nuclear Stocks Alternative Energy Stocks
Date EXC ETR D NEE DUK FE PGN SO PEG PCG EIX PPL AEP CEG XEL AEE PNW NRG DTE ASTI CSIQ HEV ENER HOKU PLUG RZTI








Mr 14 −0.3 −4.6*** −0.6 −0.9 −1.2 −0.0 −0.6 −1.5 −2.4* −2.8** −2.3* 0.3 −1.0 −0.4 −1.1 −1.2 0.2 2.5 −0.8 5.1 −1.6 −7.4* 0.8 5.3 −3.7 −8.2
Mr 15 −2.8* −1.7 −0.4 −1.7 −1.0 −2.1 −1.1 −1.3 −0.5 −2.7** −1.9 −1.9 −0.5 −3.1* −1.0 −0.6 −2.2* 1.0 0.0 12.0** 12.3** −1.6 −1.9 5.7 −1.1 1.2
Mr 16 −1.4 −1.1 −0.9 −0.5 −0.2 0.1 −0.2 0.5 −0.7 0.1 0.8 0.7 −0.4 −0.7 0.1 1.2 −0.1 2.7 0.4 −6.5 −4.6 2.8 −2.5 2.7 1.3 16.6**
Mr 17 −0.6 −2.8* −1.2 −0.7 −1.1 −1.2 −2.1* −0.5 −0.7 −0.4 −0.7 −0.7 −2.9** −1.0 −0.1 −0.4 −1.5 −0.0 −1.9* −5.4 −0.7 −2.3 −8.7* −6.4 −0.2 −3.6










Mr 21 −0.4 −0.9 0.6 0.6 −0.5 −0.5 0.1 0.3 −0.2 0.6 0.6 −0.8 −0.3 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.1 −1.2 0.2 1.0 −2.7 0.6 −4.0 2.4 0.7 −12.0*
Mr 22 2.1 2.2* 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.1 1.2 0.3 0.7 −0.5 0.6 −0.2 −0.8 −0.7 −0.7 1.7 −0.1 1.3 2.1 1.4 1.0 −0.7 2.8 1.0
Mr 23 −0.6 −0.1 −1.0 −0.8 0.1 −0.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 −0.7 −0.3 −0.6 0.8 1.2 −0.5 0.4 0.3 −0.5 −0.4 −0.7 1.0 −2.7 −0.6 −1.8 −2.4 −2.8
Mr 24 −0.8 −0.8 −0.1 −0.4 −0.5 −1.3 −0.2 −0.5 −1.0 −0.7 −0.3 −0.6 0.1 −1.0 −0.4 −0.1 0.1 −1.0 −0.4 −1.4 −2.4 −0.9 0.9 2.5 −1.0 0.8
Mr 25 −1.2 −0.7 0.1 −0.0 −0.4 −0.2 0.1 −0.0 −0.4 0.4 −0.6 0.3 −0.5 −0.4 −0.0 −0.1 −0.1 0.6 −0.1 −2.6 −1.7 1.5 −2.0 2.6 −1.5 −3.1
Mr 28 −0.8 0.1 −0.6 −0.6 0.2 −0.7 0.4 −0.1 −0.2 −0.1 −1.2 −0.1 0.1 −0.6 −0.4 0.0 −0.2 −0.0 −0.5 1.8 2.8 1.0 2.7 3.3 −0.7 5.0
Mr 29 0.8 0.6 0.2 1.0 0.6 −0.0 0.5 −0.0 0.4 −1.2 0.1 0.6 0.7 −0.1 0.4 0.7 −0.1 0.6 0.7 11.1** −0.6 4.6 −0.5 −4.6 12.3** −5.2
Mr 30 1.2 0.6 1.0 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.9 0.7 1.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.3 1.3 −3.7 −0.4 −3.9 4.2 0.1 0.4 −2.0
Mr 31 −0.2 −0.8 −0.8 0.5 0.1 0.3 −0.3 0.2 −0.2 0.7 0.2 0.9 −0.8 −0.7 −0.0 −0.3 0.1 −1.0 0.1 −2.4 −2.8 −3.7 −6.1 −2.4 1.4 2.1
Ap 1 −0.8 0.1 −0.5 0.9 1.0 −0.1 0.8 0.1 −0.6 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.4 −0.1 0.7 −0.2 0.3 −25.9*** −2.8 −0.4 2.8 −0.3 −1.0 −1.7
Ap 4 −0.2 −0.3 0.5 0.5 −0.2 −0.3 0.2 0.0 −1.9 −0.0 −0.4 0.5 −0.2 −0.6 0.3 0.8 −0.2 −1.2 0.0 −23.1*** −1.2 −1.4 −5.7 −1.1 −12.0** −1.6
Ap 5 −0.8 −0.9 −0.4 0.0 0.0 −1.0 −0.1 −0.2 −0.3 −0.1 −0.0 −1.1 −0.4 0.6 −0.6 0.1 −0.8 −1.3 0.1 6.6 −0.9 −0.2 −6.2 0.9 −1.4 −14.8**
Ap 6 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.5 0.9 1.1 2.5* 1.4 0.5 0.2 0.8 1.2 0.6 1.4 0.7 1.0 0.3 −3.2 −0.2 1.0 0.4 −1.1 3.0 −31.5***
Ap 7 −0.5 −0.7 −0.1 −0.8 −0.9 −0.1 −2.1* 0.2 −0.5 −0.5 −0.2 0.7 −0.2 3.3* −0.7 0.2 −0.3 2.5 −0.2 −0.0 −0.5 −1.0 4.9 0.4 −1.8 21.6**
Ap 8 −0.3 −0.5 −0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 −0.8 −0.3 −0.2 1.2 1.0 −0.3 1.9 −0.4 −0.8 0.1 −0.9 −0.5 −3.4 −1.6 −1.3 −1.5 1.9 2.5 2.6
Ap 11 −1.4 −1.4 −1.9* −1.5 −1.3 −1.0 −1.4 −1.7 −2.1 −1.7 −1.2 −0.6 −1.5 0.7 −1.5 −1.1 −1.2 −0.0 −1.0 0.8 −0.9 2.1 −0.6 0.5 −1.7 1.9
Ap 12 0.2 0.2 −0.6 0.3 −0.6 1.1 −0.3 −0.6 0.5 −0.5 3.6** 5.2*** −0.2 −0.1 0.2 0.8 −0.4 0.2 −0.4 3.3 1.3 −5.7 0.1 0.9 −3.3 −5.7
Ap 13 0.1 0.0 −0.4 −0.6 0.3 1.7 0.5 0.0 0.9 −0.0 0.4 −0.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 −0.5 −0.2 −0.4 0.0 4.4 1.0 5.8 5.9 1.1 −4.1 −0.1
Ap 14 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.3 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.7 −0.2 0.5 0.0 −0.2 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.1 −0.2 −2.1 −2.3 −1.7 −4.3 0.7 1.8 −3.7
Ap 15 0.9 1.0 0.8 −0.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.2 0.9 1.7 1.1 0.8 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.1 1.7 −3.2 −2.5 −1.8 0.2 −1.0 −4.9 −10.0*
All values are given in percentage. The nuclear companies are listed in descending order by their megawatt capacities. *, **, *** denote significant abnormal returns at a 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively. The p-values (not reported separately) are calculated using a MVRM and the HWZ bootstrap method as described in Hein and Westfall (2004) with
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Table B-6: Median daily ARs and mean daily CARs of nuclear and alternative energy companies
Nuclear Stocks Alternative Energy Stocks
Date France Germany Japan USA France Germany Japan USA








March 14 −3.1* −3.1* −4.7** −4.7** −2.6*** −2.6*** −0.9 −0.9 5.0* 5.0* 13.8*** 13.8*** 2.6 2.6 −1.6 −1.6
March 15 1.3 −1.8 −1.0 −5.7** −7.9*** −9.4*** −1.3 −2.2 11.4*** 16.4*** 10.0*** 25.8*** 5.0** 7.6** 1.2 −1.2
March 16 −1.2 −2.9 0.5 −5.2** 3.6*** −6.2*** −0.1 −2.1 −1.0 15.4*** −8.2*** 22.5*** −2.2 5.4 1.3 6.1
March 17 −1.5 −4.4 −0.2 −5.3* 5.0*** −1.6*** −0.7 −3.5 −1.4 14.0** 1.1 23.8*** 2.4 7.7* −3.6 5.3










March 21 3.1* 3.1* −0.6 −0.6 † † 0.1 0.1 −1.5 −1.5 −8.0** −8.0** † † 0.6 0.6
March 22 −1.2 1.9 1.2 0.6 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.5 0.5 −1.1 −2.6 −0.6* −2.2** −2.2 −2.2 1.3 1.7
March 23 1.1 3.0 0.4 1.0 −1.1** −0.7*** −0.3 0.2 0.8 −1.7 7.5* −1.2 0.3 −2.0 −1.8 −0.1
March 24 0.2 3.2 −0.9 0.2 −1.9*** −3.3 −0.5 −0.1 −0.2 −1.9 −3.0 −4.2 1.0 −1.0 −0.9 −1.0
March 25 −0.3 3.0 0.2 0.4 −0.5** −3.7** −0.1 −0.3 −1.9 −3.8 0.3 −0.5 3.0* 2.0 −1.7 −2.5
March 28 −0.1 2.8 −0.8 −0.4 −1.1*** −4.6*** −0.2 −0.6 2.1 −1.7 1.6 0.6 0.6 2.6 2.7 −0.7
March 29 0.6 3.5 −0.9 −1.3 −1.6*** −6.0*** 0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −2.2 −0.3 2.8 1.7 4.3 −0.5 −1.6
March 30 1.4 4.9 0.4 −0.9 −1.5*** −7.3*** 0.8 0.4 0.3 −2.0 −2.8 0.6 −0.7 3.6 −0.4 1.5
March 31 −1.0 3.9 −0.4 −1.3 −2.2 −10.1*** −0.0 0.3 −1.5 −3.5 0.1 −4.0 −1.2 2.4 −2.4 −2.2
April 1 −0.8 3.1 −0.6 −1.9 −2.8** −12.8*** 0.3 0.4 0.0 −3.5 −3.0 −6.4 1.9 4.3 −0.7 −1.4
April 4 0.3 3.4 1.0 −0.9 −0.5 −13.0*** −0.2 0.1 −0.1 −3.6 0.9 −4.7 0.6 5.0 −1.5 −7.1
April 5   0.8 −0.1 −0.9*** −13.7*** −0.3 0.1 −0.2 −3.8 −2.8 −6.8 2.2 7.1 −0.6 −7.5
April 6   0.3 0.2 −1.3** −15.1*** 0.8 0.9 0.3 −3.5 −0.4 −6.5 −0.3 6.8 0.1 −7.5
April 7 0.2 3.6 0.9 1.2 3.2** −11.7*** −0.2 0.9 1.1 −2.5 −1.1 −9.0 1.6 8.3 −0.3 −7.5
April 8 † † 0.5 1.7 0.8*** −11.0*** −0.2 1.0 † † −1.4 −10.5 −0.4 8.0 −1.3 −5.4
April 11 2.5 6.1 0.7 2.3 2.5*** −8.6*** −1.4 −0.4 1.2 −1.3 −0.4 −10.4 −1.3 6.6 0.5 −3.3
April 12 0.2 6.4 0.5 2.8 −1.0*** −9.1*** −0.1 −0.5 −0.1 −1.4 1.1 −8.4 1.4 8.1 0.1 −9.0
April 13 −0.7 5.7 −0.1 2.7 † † 0.0 −0.2 −3.2 −4.6 −1.5 −12.1 0.0 8.1 1.1 −4.2
April 14 −1.4 4.3 −0.4 2.3 −0.6 −10.0*** 0.6 −0.2 0.2 −4.4 0.3 −11.5 −1.8 6.3 −2.1 −8.5
April 15 −0.6 3.7 −1.2 1.2 −0.0*** −10.1*** 0.9 0.9 0.5 −3.9 −1.9 −13.4 −0.1 6.2 −2.5 −8.3
Median daily abnormal returns (in regular letters) and median daily cumulative abnormal returns (in bold letters) of nuclear and alternative energy companies in the respective
markets. All values are given in percentage. *, **, *** denote joint significant (cumulative) abnormal returns at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, corresponding to the hypotheses
given in section 2.3. The p-values (not reported separately) are calculated using a MVRM and the HWZ bootstrap method as described in Hein and Westfall (2004) with 100,000
bootstrap samples each. Confounding events according to Table B-2 are excluded from the analysis and marked with , holidays are marked with †.
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